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Contested terrain of sexual citizenship: EU accession and the changing position of 
sexual minorities in the post-Yugoslav context 
 
Katja Kahlina, University of Edinburgh1 
 
Abstract 
The paper traces the transformation of sexual citizenship in the context of the 
European Union accession process in post-Yugoslav space. It focuses on the ways in 
which the tensions between nationalism and nation-building related to the 
disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia and transnational process of EU enlargement 
influence the changing position of sexual minorities in Croatia, Serbia, and 
Montenegro. While looking at the dynamic interplay between the competing visions 
of nation and national community, EU accession process, and the citizenship status 
of sexual minorities in these three states, the paper argues that, rather than 
representing an unambiguously liberating force, EU accession in the post-Yugoslav 
context has facilitated the turning of sexual citizenship into a contested terrain where 
struggles over ‘Europeanness’, liberal pluralism, and national identity take place. 
 
Keywords: 
Sexuality, citizenship, sexual minorities, national identity, EU accession, former 
Yugoslavia 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The diverse literature on citizenship that has emerged in the past two decades shows 
that the notion of citizenship has been historically related to the formation of the 
nation-states in nineteenth century Europe (Brubaker, 1996; Calhoun, 1997, 2007; 
Hearn, 2006; Malešević, 2006). Most commonly, the notion of citizenship denotes the 
rules which determine who can belong to a particular polity, as well as the rights and 
duties for those who belong. When deliberating on the notion of citizenship, feminist 
and sexuality studies scholars argue that rights and duties and the meanings of a 
‘good citizen’ can differ significantly for different groups of people. In their view, 
categories of gender and sexuality play important roles in creating these differences 
(Pateman 1994; Richardson, 1998; Siim, 2000; Lister, 2003a; Stychin, 2003). There are 
numerous examples which show that there have been different expectations for men 
and women when it comes to particular duties to be exercised, accompanied by 
different allocation of rights. Likewise, insofar as citizenship is granted on the 
grounds of ancestry and closely linked to the idea of a clearly defined nation, it is 
directly implicated in the normalisation of heterosexual reproductive (monogamous) 
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sexuality and, by extension, in discrimination against non-heterosexual practices and 
subjects. 
The growing awareness of the close interplay between citizenship and sexuality 
facilitated the emergence of the notion of sexual citizenship which reveals how 
citizenship, despite its claims for universality, is a source of inequality based on 
sexuality. In particular, if we conceive citizenship in the broad sense as ‘social 
membership in a nation state, as a set of rights and responsibilities associated with 
that membership, and as a set of practices defining membership in the community’ 
(Cossman, 2007, p. 7), then sexual citizenship could be broadly defined as 
membership in a particular polity that is established on the grounds of sexuality. 
Sexual citizenship thus commonly refers to the ways in which sexuality is implicated 
in the scope of rights that form the basis of citizenship, such as civil, social, and 
cultural rights, and which determine the unequal citizenship status of sexual 
minorities, i.e. of those individuals whose sexual practices do not comply with the 
heterosexual norm (Lister, 2003b). 
In the past two decades the unequal citizenship status of sexual minorities 
became an object of serious contestations across the globe. Criticism posed by the 
global LGBTIQ movement brought about the re-definition of sexual citizenship 
towards less discriminatory practices and facilitated the emergence of new 
discourses of tolerance towards sexual minorities. At the same time, the actual scope 
of rights which determine citizenship status of sexual minorities differs significantly 
from state to state and it has largely been a product of tensions between global 
tendencies and dominant socio-political processes taking place at the national level 
(Stychin, 2003; Binnie, 2004). 
The tensions between the local and the global are particularly salient in the post-
Yugoslav context where the nation-building processes of the 1990s were soon 
followed by the opening towards transnational influences in relation to the (aspiring) 
European Union accession process. In this paper I want to address the ways in which 
the tensions between nationalism and nation-building related to the disintegration of 
SFR Yugoslavia and the transnational process of EU enlargement influence the 
transformation of sexual citizenship in the context of the new states of South East 
Europe. I will focus on three particular cases – post-Yugoslav Croatia, Serbia, and 
Montenegro – as the contexts in which we can observe a clear transformatory role of 
the (aspiring) EU accession process when it comes to the citizenship status of sexual 
minorities. The central research question of this paper is the following: In what ways 
do the tensions between national and transnational processes influence the 
transformation of sexual minorities’ citizenship status in the post-Yugoslav context?
 In order to answer this question I will address the dynamic interplay between 
the competing visions of nation and national community, EU accession process, and 
the citizenship status of sexual minorities in these three national contexts. I will argue 
that sexuality has played a critical role in national identity construction not only in 
the nation-building period, but also in the context of EU accession when the new 
visions of national identity based on the principles of liberal pluralism and tolerance 
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emerged. Different normative conceptions of sexuality, as I will show, came to 
represent one of the central markers of difference between the competing visions of 
national identity, community, and desired future. However, despite the 
commonalities when it comes to the decisive influence of EU accession on re-
definition of national identity and citizenship status of sexual minorities in these 
contexts, we can also observe considerable differences. The local variations in the 
level in which the citizenship status of sexual minorities has or has not been 
improved, as I will suggest, are conditioned not only by the level of advancement 
towards the EU membership, but also, and perhaps more importantly, by distinct 
legacies of the 1990s and different visions of nation-EU relations which exist in these 
contexts. 
In the first part of my paper I will articulate my theoretical and analytical 
position regarding the notion of sexual citizenship. I will particularly focus on how 
the interplay between the symbolic processes through which national communities 
are imagined and the citizenship status of sexual minorities has been discussed in the 
existing literature. In the second part I will explore the relationship between national 
identity construction and the citizenship status of sexual minorities in the context of 
the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia. The third section will consist of the analysis of 
the transformation of sexual citizenship in post-2000 Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro 
in the light of the (aspired to) EU accession process. In this section I will first analyse 
the relationship between discourses on EU conditionality and acts that have been 
adopted since the EU membership became one of the main political aims in Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Croatia, and which explicitly mention discrimination on the 
grounds of sexuality or the rights of sexual minorities. Second, I will discuss the 
influences of the global politics of sexuality and EU accession process on the ways in 
which the right of assembly has been argued for and exercised in relation to Pride 
Marches. Third, I will account for the existing homophobic discourses employed in 
the attempts to contest the on-going transformation of sexual citizenship in these 
three contexts. In addition to legal and media sources, in my analysis I will draw on 
the existing literature on gender and sexuality in the (post-)Yugoslav space together 
with the interviews I conducted with local NGO activists, members of the relevant 
institutions, and scholars working on issues of sexual citizenship in this region. 
 
1. Sexual citizenship: National imaginaries and legal realities 
 
Insofar as citizenship signifies the institutionalised set of norms which determine 
who and under what conditions can belong to a particular nation-state, it is closely 
linked with the notion of community and the ways in which communities have been 
imagined (Staeheli, 2008). As feminist scholars argue, the particular normative 
visions of gender and sexuality have often played a significant role in the national 
identity construction process (Parker et al, 1992; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Spike Peterson, 
1999; Nagel, 2003). For example, in the context of nationalism that invokes an alleged 
common descent as a way of defining the boundaries of a community, women’s 
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reproductive capacities and reproductive heterosexuality are often constructed as the 
obvious and ultimate bearers of national unity and survival (Anthias and Yuval-
Davis, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1997). In such a context, non-heterosexual individuals are 
usually conceived as ‘immoral’ and ‘foreign’ to an imagined national tradition and 
essence (Nagel, 2003; Kahlina, 2011). As recent studies reveal, normative conceptions 
of gender and sexuality may play a great role even in the cases where national 
identities are constructed on the bases of liberal pluralism, tolerance, and human 
rights, such as is the case with some Western European countries like UK or 
Germany for example (Richardson, 1998; Stychin, 1998; Binnie, 2004; Puar, 2007; 
Haritaworn, Tauqir, and Erdem; 2008). In these contexts, the proclaimed tolerance 
towards sexual minorities is incorporated in the national imaginary as a marker of 
their alleged progressiveness, tolerance, and modernity that should distinguish them 
from ‘others’, i.e. ‘backward’ and ‘homophobic’ immigrant populations (Puar, 2007; 
Haritaworn et al, 2008).2  
These symbolic practices through which identity of a particular national 
community is being re/constructed play important roles in determining the features 
of sexual citizenship. The dominant conceptions of nation, gender, and sexuality are 
reflected in various laws and policies, such as family codes, citizenship and 
immigration acts, but also labour and health insurance acts, that participate in the 
production of the particular regimes of gender and sexuality and define citizenship 
status of sexual minorities. As Brenda Cossman (2007) points out, law is embedded 
in the particular socio-cultural context and is not completely separated from the non-
legal socio-cultural sphere where different meanings that participate in the 
production of sexual citizenship are formed. Cossman particularly speaks of the 
interplay between law and popular culture in terms of ‘different ways in which 
images, norms, and narratives of popular culture seep into the legal discourse and, 
conversely, the ways legal discourse casts its shadow over popular culture’ (p. 18). 
Thus, the citizenship status of sexual minorities is not only determined by law and 
different sets of civil, political, social, and cultural rights, but is also affected by 
various meanings that exist independently of law but which nevertheless influence 
and, in turn, are influenced by law.  
As I will show in this paper, Cossman’s argument on the interplay between the 
law and cultural repertoire available in the particular social context is particularly 
relevant when it comes to sexual citizenship in post-Yugoslav space where sexuality 
has played an important role in the symbolic process of national identity 
re/construction in relation to nation building and EU accession. Keeping this in mind, 
in my analysis of the transformation of sexual citizenship in the interface between 
                                                 
2 The processes of nationalization that rely on the discourses of tolerance towards sexual minorities in 
some Western nation-states have been commonly termed as homonationalism (Puar, 2007) and were 
regarded as limited assimilation  of ‘good gay citizens’ that instead of equality resulted in de-
politicisation and further privatisation of sexuality (Richardson, 2004). 
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global and local in the post-Yugoslav context I will focus on the ways in which the 
competing meanings, norms, and beliefs in relation to national identity influence the 
legal changes which determine the citizenship status of sexual minorities.  
While looking at the ways in which sexual citizenship has been transformed at 
the interface between nationalism and nation-building and EU enlargement process, 
I will be cautious not to produce a narrative of progress towards supposedly 
liberated and tolerant Western societies. I will be particularly careful not to depict the 
EU as a liberating force that came to rescue local lesbians and gays from the jaws of 
heteronationalism. Rather, I will regard EU accession as a process that opened up a 
space for political mobilisation not only to sexual rights activists, but to centre-left 
and right-wing proponents alike who draw on different normative assumptions 
about sexuality in order to establish their visions of national identity and desired 
future. In this way, I argue, in the context of the EU accession process sexual 
citizenship became a contested terrain where struggles over EU accession, liberal 
pluralism, and national identity and tradition take place. 
Before I move to the discussion of sexual citizenship in the context of SFR 
Yugoslavia and its dissolution in the 1990s, let me briefly reflect upon the 
terminology that I will employ in my paper. In my analysis of the changing 
citizenship status of sexual minorities I will use the term ‘sexual minorities’ in order 
to account for different groups of people marginalized on the grounds of sexuality. 
My use of the term ‘minority’ however differs from the ways in which the term has 
been employed within the dominant multicultural framework where the status of 
‘minority’ has been established on grounds of the quantity of members of particular 
ethnic, national, or sexual groups in the particular national context. The approach 
that relies on the quantitative relationship between different social groups, it has 
been argued, naturalizes ethnic and national differences as given, closed, indivisible, 
and unified, thus re/producing the existing relations of power (Yuval-Davis, 1997). In 
contrast to the view of a ‘minority’ that is based on numbers, my use of the term 
‘sexual minorities’ is informed by the meanings put forward by the ‘Future of 
Minority Studies’ (FMS) project that articulates the notion of ‘minority’ on the 
grounds of the existing power relation(s) that construct and position groups 
differently on the power scale. Thus, instead of referring to numbers, the notion of 
‘minority’ within this framework signifies the non-hegemonic position that is formed 
on the grounds of its unequal relation to the dominant group (Alcoff and Mohanty, 
2006, p. 7-8). Throughout my paper I use the term ‘sexual minorities’ precisely in 
such a power-focused sense in order to stress the power relations through which 
unequal citizenship status based on sexuality is re/produced. In addition to ‘sexual 
minorities’ I will occasionally refer to particular identity categories such as ‘lesbian’ 
or ‘gay’ in order to account for their different social positionality. 
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2. Sexual citizenship in SFR Yugoslavia and in the first decade after its 
dissolution: Legal frameworks, civil initiatives, and heteronationalism 
 
When socialist Yugoslavia was established during World War II male homosexuality 
was illegal, which made non-heterosexual sexualities mostly invisible in public life.3 
The 1959 Criminal Law of SFR Yugoslavia criminalized male homosexuality and 
stipulated one year in prison if the offense occurred.4 Lesbian relationships and 
practices were not criminalized, but rather defined as ‘wanton acts’ (bludna radnja) 
subject to misdemeanor charges. Following the constitutional changes of 1974, when 
the legislative power was transferred from the federal authorities to those of the 
republics and provinces, the common 1959 Criminal Law was repealed (Vuletić, 
2003). The decisions of the Yugoslav republics and provinces on decriminalization of 
male homosexuality were not synchronized. Socialist Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, 
and Montenegro, and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina 
decriminalized male homosexuality in 1977 (ibid.). In Serbia decriminalization of 
male homosexual practices occurred in 1994, well after homosexuality had been 
removed as a psychiatric disorder from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM).5 
Together with the legal reforms that positively influenced the position of non-
heterosexual people, the 1980s were marked by a proliferation of pro-democratic 
libertarian initiatives with Ljubljana as the centre of the new political organizing. The 
student initiatives in Ljubljana also included a gay movement with first gay and 
lesbian groups emerging in the mid-1980s.6 The libertarian spirit in Ljubljana was 
met with a sympathetic reception in Zagreb. Influenced by the affirmation of the new 
perspectives in the cultural life of Ljubljana, Youth Radio (Omladinski radio), managed 
by the League of Socialist Youth of Trešnjevka district in Zagreb, broadcast a show 
called Frigid Socket (Frigidna utičnica) in 1984 focusing on issues of sexuality, 
homosexuality included  (Vuletić, 2003). In the late 1980s the first lesbian group in 
Zagreb Lavender Initiative (Lila inicijativa) was established (Sagasta, 2001). In 
Belgrade, the first public engagements towards equality of sexual minorities started 
in the beginning of 1990s when the first activists held informal meetings in café 
Moskva. The meetings grew into a more formal group for the promotion and equal 
                                                 
3 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was structured as a federation of six republics – SR 
Slovenia, SR Croatia, SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, SR Serbia, SR Montenegro, SR Macedonia, now all 
independent states, and two autonomous provinces within Serbia, SAP Vojvodina and SAP Kosovo. 
4 Criminal Law, act no. 189, article no. 2, 1959. 
5 Members of the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality as a phychiatric disorder 
from DSM in 1973. 
6 In 1984 a student group for the rights of homosexual people called Magnus was established as the 
first LGBT group in the whole Eastern Europe (Kuhar, 2011). In the same year the group organized the 
first lesbian and gay festival ‘Homosexuality and Culture.’ In 1987 the lesbian section of Student 
Cultural Centre called ŠKUC-LL emerged as the first lesbian group in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe. 
In the late 1980s, Magnus and LL were involved in a number of public activities and initiatives that 
problematised social exclusion based on sexuality (Kuhar, 2006).  
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position of sexual minorities called Arkadija. The group was formed in 1991 but was 
not officially registered until male homosexuality has been decriminalised in 1994 
(Savić, 2009). However, although the reformist activist spirit spread from Ljubljana to 
Zagreb and later on to Belgrade, the dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia and related 
armed conflicts taking place in the 1990s would have a great impact on the 
citizenship status of sexual minorities. 
The violent dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation at the beginning of the 
1990s resulted in the emergence of the new states of Southeast Europe. Former 
Yugoslav state SR Croatia gained international recognition as a new independent 
state, while former Yugoslav states Serbia and Montenegro formed a new federation 
– Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). New national identities emerging in the 
context of nationalisation processes and struggles over self-determination at the 
beginning of the 1990s were increasingly constituted in ethnic terms (Malešević, 
2006). The prevailing ideas of national community grounded in the logic of ethnic 
descent as a basis of belonging were reflected in the new citizenship laws of the 
newly emerging states. These laws, especially in the case of Croatia, openly 
privileged the core ethnic group while at the same time making it harder for people 
of other ethnic backgrounds, or those perceived as such, to regulate their citizenship 
status (Štiks, 2010). In this way, as Igor Štiks (2010) points out, citizenship laws 
became a tool of ‘ethnic engineering’ (p. 11) in the context of the violent dissolution 
of SFR Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1990s.  
Normative assumptions about gender division and reproductive 
heterosexuality can be observed as becoming instrumental in the making of new 
ethnicity-based nations in this context as important markers of ethnic homogeneity. 
In particular, the new national imaginary constructed women/women’s bodies as 
symbolic markers of ethnicity/nation and its imagined territory. Facing the risk of 
being violated and invaded, they were seen to be in need of protection. At the same 
time, men were given the role of protectors of women and the nation. More 
importantly, they were also constructed as bearers of the ‘genetic material of the 
nation,’ which, in the act of rape, was planted in the body/territory of the ethnic 
other, violating in this way its national integrity (Mostov, 1995; Pavlović, 1999; 
Žarkov, 2001; 2007). 
In the context of dominant nationalist discourses, the only proper role for 
women was to be mothers, i.e. bearers of future generations and reproductive 
heterosexuality was perceived as important means of securing the survival and 
potency of the ethnicity/nation (Žarkov, 2007). In Croatia the dominant sexualised 
constructions of nation and nationalist heteronormativity allowed and gave 
legitimacy to homophobic discourses to flourish in the public space (Vuletić, 2008). 
At the same time, notwithstanding non-criminal status or recent decriminalisation, 
citizenship status of sexual minorities in the 1990s in Croatia and FR Yugoslavia was 
far from equal. Laws that would protect sexual minorities from discrimination were 
completely absent, leaving non-heterosexual individuals as easy targets of 
marginalisation, stigmatisation, and violence. Moreover, same sex partnerships were 
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not legally recognised, which denied sexual minorities access to numerous civil and 
cultural rights granted to heterosexual families, from the right to take care of the 
partners who are ill and visit them in the hospital, to joint parenting and inability to 
obtain a visa or residence permit on the grounds of partnership. In other words, 
although they had access to citizenship in terms of membership in the polity, the 
citizenship status of sexual minorities differed significantly from the status of their 
heterosexual counterparts.  
The cultural logic of nationalism that instrumentalised the particular norms of 
gender and sexuality was greatly supported by the dominant religious communities 
(Catholic and Orthodox Church) whose influence on state politics in the 1990s was 
very strong and still has a significant impact on society and political elites. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s both the Catholic and Orthodox Church, which have been 
intimately connected to nationalist political elites and their ideology (Škrabalo and 
Jurić, 2005; Radović, 2009), have been vigorously condemning sexual non-conformity 
and non-heterosexual practices. Their official position, shared by the members of 
nationalist political elites, includes the assumptions that life begins with conception, 
and that reproduction-oriented intercourse within the monogamous heterosexual 
marriage is the only acceptable sexual practice (Škrabalo and Jurić, 2005). In line with 
its official doctrine, non-heterosexual identities and practices have often been 
denounced as sinful, evil, unnatural, and in contrast to Christian morality (Vuletić, 
2008). Moreover, both the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Orthodox Church in 
Serbia have gained significant media attention and have been recognized as 
important moral authorities when it comes to different issues related to sexuality, 
from the legal status of abortion and assisted reproduction to the social position of 
sexual minorities (Škrabalo and Jurić, 2005, Radović, 2009). The dominance of 
heteronormative discourses that posit heterosexuality as the only legitimate form of 
sexual relationship, together with silencing of all other discourses of sexuality, 
legitimised exclusionary laws and policies and made citizenship status of sexual 
minorities particularly difficult. 
However, the 2000s were a period of significant change for dominant socio-
political and symbolic processes, bringing about a re/definition of national identities 
in the post-Yugoslav space. Among others, this decade has been marked by the EU 
accession process that has influenced the emergence of pro-EU visions of national 
identities and future. As I will show in the next section, sexual citizenship has again 
been placed in the centre of the new national(ist) visions and socio-political changes.  
 
3. ‘Europeanisation’ of sexual citizenship   
 
In 2000 there was a change of government in Croatia and FR Yugoslavia: with pro-
democratic liberal forces assuming power, both countries found themselves on the 
road towards EU membership. The first decade of the new century also saw new 
state trans/formation in this region. In 2002 FR Yugoslavia was transformed into 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. A couple of years later, in 2006, Montenegro 
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declared its full independence. Croatia was the first of the three states to apply for 
EU membership in 2003 and recently in July 2013 it became the 28th EU member state. 
Although Montenegro did not submit its application for EU membership until 2008, 
and Serbia applied only in 2009, desire for membership in the European Union was 
largely present in the political and social life in all three states. 
EU accession made a significant impact on re-definition of both national 
identities and sexual citizenship. The unequal citizenship status of sexual minorities 
has gradually entered public debate and legislation in Croatia, Serbia, and 
Montenegro, resulting in the changing citizenship status of sexual minorities. In my 
analysis of these changes, I will argue that particular understandings of sexuality and 
sexual citizenship were again utilised as a rhetorical tool for constructing different 
visions of national identity, community, and desired future. I will show how the 
introduced legal improvements of the citizenship status of sexual minorities were 
portrayed as part of European values and EU conditionality and how this, in turn, 
influenced the joining of homophobic, nationalist, religious, and anti-EU discourses 
in the mobilization against the transformation of sexual citizenship. I will claim that 
in this way sexual citizenship became a crucial terrain where the struggles over EU 
accession and national identity and tradition take place.  
3.1. ‘Towards Europe:’ EU conditionality and shifting national identities 
 
In the context of the European Union, legal changes in the field of employment have 
been the dominant arena in which the unequal citizenship status of sexual minorities 
has been addressed. Discrimination against sexual minorities as an issue was for the 
first time directly included in Council Directive 2000/78/EC, which explicitly argues 
that ‘[d]iscrimination based on … sexual orientation may undermine the 
achievement of the objectives of the EC Treaty’ (cited in Kochenov, 2007, p. 26), and it 
has also been addressed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 
the same year. However, legal stipulations that deal with issues of family, marriage, 
and civil partnership were left in the domain of national legislation (Kuhar, 2011).  
Although the rights of sexual minorities entered the EU legal discourse at the 
beginning of the 2000s, they did not play a significant role in defining the 
requirements for 2004 and 2007 enlargements (Kochenov, 2007; O’Dwyer and 
Schwartz, 2010). The stronger emphasis on the protection of sexual minorities can be 
observed in 2009 in the context of the accession process in Croatia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia. In 2009 the European Commission Progress Report for Croatia stated that 
‘[M]ore needs to be done to tackle discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people are subjected to threats and attacks. 
Many cases are not followed-up adequately by the police and prosecutors, or remain 
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unreported.’7 Likewise, the Article 33 of the EP Resolution 2012 on the European 
integration process of Serbia calls on ‘state and city authorities to work diligently on 
building an atmosphere of tolerance, including awareness-raising campaigns against 
homophobia, in line with European standards.’8  
The inclusion of the treatment of sexual minorities in the EU monitoring 
process can be explained by the fact that the unequal citizenship status of sexual 
minorities gradually gained more attention in a number of EU member states during 
the 2000s and became one of the most relevant issues when it comes to social equality 
in the EU. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge the growing influence of 
international human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty 
International as well as international organizations dealing with the rights and status 
of sexual minorities such as ILGA Europe who have been working together with 
European institutions in countering the ‘discriminatory actions of national 
governments that violate human rights’ (Holzhacker, 2013, p. 3). At the same time, 
the stronger monitoring and increasing demands imposed by the EU have to do with 
the ways in which the ‘Western Balkans’ region (former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia 
plus Albania) have been depicted as backward and not-civilized enough (Kahlina, 
2012; Butterfield, 2013). In line with the existing discourses, the violence against 
sexual minorities and the lack of Pride Marches in this region have served as an 
important marker of difference that framed these states as not ‘European’ enough. In 
opposition to homophobic Eastern Europe, Western Europe is framed as a place of 
rights and safety for sexual minorities, strengthening its image as a role model of 
liberal pluralism and democracy for Eastern Europe to follow. In this way, the 
problematic ‘catching up’ model that secures the Western leadership position while 
keeping the (South)East in the need of help from the West is reinforced. Thus, it can 
be argued that there is an inherent ambiguity in the EU’s politics of conditionality 
when it comes to the citizenship status of sexual minorities. On the one hand, it puts 
an emphasis on the positive practices concerning the position of sexual minorities in 
the EU and beyond. On the other hand, such politics have been employed in the 
re/production of other forms of inequality within the EU.  
The discourses of progress that include tolerance towards sexual minorities as 
markers of ‘Europeaness’ have been differently negotiated in the context of the 
(aspiring) EU accession process. Since the beginning of 2000s the values of inclusive 
plurality and tolerance have become part of the new changing national identities in 
all three states in question. The implementation of these allegedly European liberal 
democratic values served as ‘proof’ of ‘Europeanness’ and a desired ‘European’ 
                                                 
7 The report is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/hr_rapport_2009_en.pdf. Last accessed in 
April, 2013.   
8 See the European Parliament resolution on the European integration process of Serbia 
(2011/2886(RSP). The resolution is available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2012-
0188&language=EN. Last accessed in May, 2013. 
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future. Under the influence of EU enlargement politics and rhetoric, sexuality and 
the rights of sexually marginalized people were incorporated into the newly 
emerging liberal democratic yet nationalist imaginary. However, the process in 
which national identities have been re-defined according to the principles of 
tolerance towards sexual minorities has had somewhat different trajectories and 
results in the three national contexts in question. These differences have been to a 
great extent conditioned upon the distinct visions of ‘Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’ 
existing in these contexts,’ especially in the cases of Serbia and Croatia.  
In Croatia the strong presence of an anti-Balkanist discourse in the nationalist 
rhetoric started to dominate public discourse from the beginning of the armed 
conflict, and have framed the separation from Yugoslavia as Croatia’s long-awaited 
‘return to Europe’. This discourse has had strong orientalist overtones, and have 
interchangeably articulated ‘Yugoslavia,’ ‘Serbia,’ and the ‘Balkans,’ as the 
‘constitutive other’ against which the Croatian national identity was constructed as 
‘civilized,’ ‘democratic,’ and ‘European’ (Razsa and Lindstrom, 2004). In other words, 
the anti-Balkanist discourse that has been in the service of separating Croatia from 
‘the rest of the Balkans/Yugoslavia/Serbia’ clearly contrasted ‘uncivilized and unruly 
Balkans’ and ‘civilized Europe,’ and have placed Croatia within the circle of 
‘European civility.’ The idea of ‘Europe’ thus came to represent an important ethical 
and civilizational authority in Croatia’s national imaginary. In line with this symbolic 
position of Europe in the dominant political discourses there has been a strong 
national consensus between all the mainstream left-wing and right-wing political 
parties that EU accession represents one of the most important political goals.   
In Serbia the discourses of liberal democratic pluralism and tolerance gained 
greater presence in the public space after the October 5th elections in 2000 when the 
pro-democratic and pro-EU forces gained political power (Greenberg, 2006). As 
Jessica Greenberg (2006) argues, after October 5th political elites together with NGOs 
and intellectuals strove to incorporate the values of democracy, tolerance, and 
multiculturalism in the new national imaginary as a proof of Serbia’s ‘Europeanness’. 
However, although in the post-2000 period Europe has been framed as a desired 
space of belonging and a desirable, even inevitable, economic partner, its moral 
authority has not been embraced in the same way as in Croatia. One of the most 
obvious explanations which could account for this difference lies in the different 
legacies of Serbian relations with the Western world in general and with the EU in 
particular. International sanctions, the NATO bombing in 1999, as well as 
contemporary EU politics towards Kosovo have influenced the emergence of an anti-
Western discourse (Greenberg, 2006). Within the logic of the anti-Western discourse 
‘anything associated with “the West” could also be put in the category of anti-
Serbian’ (ibid., p. 334). Anti-Westernism in Serbia gained considerable prominence 
and rhetorical power, and has become a viable political stance that offers an 
alternative vision of Serbia-EU relations.  
It could be argued that the re-definition of national imaginary in relation to 
EU accession process in Montenenegro bears some similarities with both the 
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Croatian and Serbian contexts. On the one hand, anti-Western discourses did not 
gain the same prominence as they did in Serbia. There has been a strong consensus 
among Montenegrin political elites over desired EU accession, which brought them 
together in the ‘European Montenegro Coalition’ (Koalicija Europska Crna Gora). At 
the same time, unlike Croatia, the notions of ‘Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’ have not 
been framed as mutually opposing signifiers in the pro-European visions of 
Montenegrin identity. 
I will now address how the dynamic interplay between the EU accession 
process and different visions of Europe and geo-political relations with the EU have 
influenced the transformation of sexual citizenship in post-2000 Croatia, Serbia, and 
Montenegro. I will first analyse the legal changes pertaining to the citizenship status 
of sexual minorities since they have been the most direct outcome of EU 
conditionality. 
 
3.2. Legal changes pertaining to the citizenship status of sexual minorities 
 
The impact of the EU policies is mostly visible in the similarities related to the anti-
discrimination laws and institutions that should monitor their implementation, and 
which are part of the obligations imposed by the EU in the context of the (aspired) 
EU accession process.9 Until now, all three states have introduced the Anti-
discrimination Acts, which explicitly condemn discrimination on the grounds of 
‘sexual orientation.’ At the same time they have established an independent 
institution like the office of Ombudsperson for Gender Equality in Croatia, 
Commissioner for the Protection of Equality in Serbia, and Protector of Human 
Rights and Freedoms of Montenegro in Montenegro with the role of monitoring and 
reporting the practices of discrimination. However, despite these institutional 
similarities, there have been some differences in the citizenship status of sexual 
minorities in these states. 
The first legal recognition of same-sex partnerships in the post-Yugoslav states 
took place in Croatia in 2003 when the Same-Sex Partnerships Act (Zakon o 
istospolnim zajednicama) was adopted. However, in contrast to many benefits granted 
to married heterosexual couples by the Family Code and other acts, the Same-Sex 
Partnerships Act, which has remained unchanged until the present day,10 includes 
only three stipulations – the right to common property, the right to be sustained by 
the partner, and prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of same-sex 
relationship and homosexual orientation. Ironically, as noted by Roman Kuhar 
(2011), by granting only two rights to same-sex couples, the Same-Sex Partnerships 
                                                 
9 Based on interviews with Višnja Ljubičić, Ombudswoman for Gender Equality in Croatia and Emila 
Spasojević, senior adviser in the Office of Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, conducted in 
December 2012. 
10 At the time of writing this paper, the appointed working group is preparing the proposal of the new 
Life Partnership Act (Zakon of životnom partnerstvu).  
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Act actually reinforces the discrimination it prohibits, thus breaking the rule it was 
supposed to establish.   
In addition to the Same-Sex Partnerships Act, anti-discriminatory stipulations 
have been incorporated in many acts, including the Labor Act (Zakon o radu), the 
Media Law (Zakon o medijima), the Sport Act (Zakon o sportu), and the Science and 
Higher Education Act (Zakon o znanosti i visokom obrazovanju), to name a few. In 2008 
the Croatian Parliament, by then with a right-wing majority, adopted the Anti-
discrimination Act (Zakon o suzbijanju diskriminacije) that explicitly mentions sexual 
orientation, gender identity and gender expression. Given the national consensus on 
the EU accession and the position of the notion of ‘Europe’ in the Croatian national 
imaginary, it does not come as surprise that the right-wing majority passed the law, 
though not without conflict with their usual allies the Catholic Church. The political 
elites legitimized their move by referring to the need to harmonize Croatian 
legislation with EU norms.11 
 In Serbia, same-sex partnerships have not been legally recognised. However, 
similarly to Croatia, in Serbia the parliament adopted a number of stipulations that 
prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexuality during the 2000s. The 
stipulations that ban discrimination based on sexual orientation are included in the 
Public Informing Act (Zakon o javnom informisanju), Labor Act (Zakon o radu), Higher 
Education Act (Zakon o visokom obrazovanju), and Broadcasting Act (Zakon of 
Radiodifuziji). However, it was not until the late 2000s that Serbian political elites 
started to occasionally refer to the unequal position of sexual minorities in public. In 
2009, despite the fierce resistance of right-wing parties and nationalist and religious 
officials, the Anti-discrimination Act (Zakon o zabrani diskriminacije) was adopted, 
explicitly mentioning gender identity and sexual orientation. Similarly to the 
Croatian case, political elites justified their readiness to legally protect sexual 
minorities against discrimination mostly by referring to the aspired EU 
membership.12 They depicted the need to terminate discrimination on the grounds of 
sexuality as part of ‘Western’ (or ‘European’) legal and moral standards that have to 
be adopted by accessing countries. 
In Montenegro the legal changes pertaining to the citizenship status of sexual 
minorities started well after the government applied for EU membership. This could 
perhaps be explained by taking into account the relatively low pressure from the 
local activists, who have become more organised and visible in the past couple of 
                                                 
11 In her statement about the Anti-discrimination Act Jadranka Kosor, Deputy Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Family, Defenders, and Intergenerational Solidarity at that time, emphasised that Anti-
discrimination Act represents legal harmonisation of Croatian legislation with EU acquis. See for 
example article published on Dnevnik.hr web portal ‘Kosor: Zakonom o suzbijanju discriminacije 
spriječit će se bilo koji oblik diskriminacije’ [Kosor: Anti-discrimination Act Will Prevent Every Form 
of Discrimination], March 28, 2008, available at http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/kosor-zakonom-o-
suzbijanju-diskriminacije-sprijecit-ce-se-bilo-koji-oblik-diskriminacije.html, last retrieved in July 2013. 
12 In Serbia the adoption of the Anti-Discrimination Act has been argued to be a condition for the visa 
liberalisation.  
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years.13 In the past two years, the Montenegrin government has been increasingly 
willing to deal with the unequal position of sexual minorities,14 which culminated in 
the Strategy for Improving the Quality of Life of LGBT People for the Period 2013-
2018 (Strategija unapređenja kvaliteta života LGBT osoba za period 2013-2018. godine) 
made by the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights. 
In 2010 the Anti-discrimination Act (Zakon o zabrani diskriminacije) that 
includes sexual orientation and gender identity was adopted. In addition to the Anti-
discrimination Act, two more acts explicitly forbade discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation: the Labor Act (Zakon o radu) and the Media Law (Zakon o 
medijima). In 2011 the Montenegrin government organised an international 
conference on human rights with the special focus on the rights of sexual minorities 
suggestively entitled ‘Towards Europe, Towards Equality’ (Ka Evropi, ka jednakosti), 
thus confirming the importance of the aspired to EU accession when it comes to 
transformation of sexual citizenship in Montenegro.15 
What we can see from this overview of the introduced legal changes that 
directly influence the citizenship status of sexual minorities is that gradually 
discrimination on the grounds of ‘sexual orientation’ has been recognized as an issue 
that engenders social inequality and as such is sanctioned by law. However, at the 
same time, these changes have some limitations. In case of Serbia and Montenegro 
there is no mention of the alternative, non-heterosexual, relationships, which means 
that people living in such communities do not enjoy numerous benefits granted to 
monogamous heterosexual couples. In the case of Croatia, the law now recognizes 
only monogamous same-sex partnerships and this has been done in a way that is far 
from the full equality. The hierarchical distinction between ‘heterosexual majority’ 
and ‘homosexual minority’ is reflected in the Same-Sex Partnerships Act which 
includes few stipulations in contrast to the many benefits granted to married 
heterosexual couples by the Family Code and other acts, from a right to take care of 
the partners who are ill and visit them in the hospital, to joint parenting and ability to 
obtain a visa or residence permit on the grounds of partnership. The incorporation of 
same-sex relations as ‘special minority rights’ into the legal framework constructed 
the ‘homosexual population’ that stands in contrast to ‘normal heterosexual 
majority.’ As a result, legal changes concerning the citizenship status of sexual 
minorities in Croatia and Serbia did not significantly challenge existing inequalities 
when it comes to sexual citizenship: the nuclear heterosexual family remains the 
normative social unit positioning sexual minorities as citizens without an access to 
equal rights.  
However, the question is whether these changes were introduced with the aim 
of discrediting the main heteronormative assumptions about sexuality and family. 
                                                 
13 This was pointed out to me in the interwiev with Stevan Milivojević in Podgorica, December 5, 2013. 
14 Ibid.  
15 For more details see the report on the conference published on the web-sites of the Government of 
Montenegro: http://www.gov.me/naslovna/Konferencija_Ka_Evropi_Ka_jednakosti/, last retreived in 
July 2013.  
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As we saw above, political elites did not justify the adoption of non-discriminatory 
acts and stipulations by criticizing the unequal position that some of the citizens 
experience. They rather invoked the EU regulations and mandatory legal 
harmonisation as the main reason and impetus behind these changes. By so doing, I 
would like to argue, these moderate liberal discourses have been directly feeding 
into the increasing resistance towards both the equality of sexual minorities and 
‘Europeanisation’ that will be discussed further below.  
In sum, it is possible to argue that the transformation of sexual citizenship in 
relation to aspired EU membership in the post-Yugoslav context has brought about 
some positive changes regarding the citizenship status of sexual minorities. 
However, these changes have been partial and limited. In the next two sections I will 
discuss in more details the wider social effects of EU conditionality on the citizenship 
status of sexual minorities. I will first discuss how the EU recommendations together 
with the global politics of sexuality influenced the ways in which the right of 
assembly has been exercised in the context of Pride Marches. Second, I will show the 
ways in which the on-going transformation of sexual citizenship was utilised by 
nationalist organisations and initiatives, Catholic and Orthodox Church and right-
wing parties whose political agenda has been increasingly informed by the 
heterosexist discourses.  
 
3.3. Right to visibility: EU recommendations, Pride Marches and sexual 
citizenship 
 
As the above discussion suggests, EU accession represents a strong impetus for the 
transformation of the citizenship status of sexual minorities in the post-Yugoslav 
context. The role of the EU as facilitator of change is particularly visible when it 
comes to the activities of the civil sector. In all three states in focus the EU regulations 
and recommendations constitute a crucial part of the strategies and lobbying 
activities employed by the local NGOs dealing with the issue of sexual equality. 
Furthermore, communication with EU Parliament Members like Marije Cornelissen 
and Ulrike Lunacek, who are at the same time members of the European Parliament 
Intergroup on LGBT Rights, intensified in the last couple of years.16 Finally, the EU 
through its Delegation in each of the accessing countries also acts as an important 
donor supporting the activities of civil sector against sexually-based discrimination.17 
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the Pride Marches, which have been 
recognised by the EU as an important marker of democratisation and human rights 
                                                 
16 The regular communication with Cornelissen and Lunacek as well as the strategic deployment of 
EU accession in their activities was reported to me by LGBT activists during my field research in 
Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia conducted in December 2012.  
17 For example, among the activities financially supported by Delegation of the European Union to 
Montenegro was a large-scale project called ‘Montenegro: A Bright Spot on the Gay Map’ (Crna Gora – 
svijetla tačka na gej mapi).   
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promotion (Holzhacker, 2013), became one of the central events in the struggle for 
equal citizenship status of sexual minorities.  
The Pride March is premised upon the right of assembly in the liberal democratic 
societies and it usually consists of a short march through the city centre finishing 
with political speeches and a short entertaining program. In addition to the impact of 
the EU accession, Pride Marches in the post-Yugoslav states have also been 
influenced by the global LGBTIQ movement. Soon after the ‘Stonewall Rebellion’ in 
1969 the organisation of Pride Marches became one of the main driving forces behind 
the transformation of the politics of sexuality in the North America, Western Europe 
and Australia. With the development of communication technologies and the fresh 
influx of capital coming from the Western donors, the global LGBTIQ movement 
became an important source of influence for the emerging politics of visibility and 
transformations of sexual citizenship in the post-Yugoslav space.18  
The first Pride March in the post-Yugoslav space was scheduled to take place in 
Belgrade on June 30, 2001, in the period when democratic and pro-European reforms 
were still in their infancy (Greenberg, 2006). It was violently attacked and disrupted 
by groups of football fans and members of extremist nationalist organizations before 
it even started in the main square. The threat and fear of violence discouraged 
activists from staging the March in the following years. The threat of violence was 
also used by the government to ban the second Belgrade Pride in 2009. Following the 
promulgation of the Anti-discrimination Act in 2009 and stronger pressure from EU 
officials (Mikuš, 2011) the second Belgrade Pride took place in 2010. It enjoyed full 
police protection from the violent mob consisting of a couple of thousands of self-
proclaimed football fans and members of extremist and national-religious groups. 
Again, instead of preventing the violence, the destruction and violence that occurred 
during and after the 2010 Pride March were used by the government as an excuse to 
ban the planned Pride Marches in the following years.19 By doing so, government 
broke the existing Anti-discrimination law and reinforced the unequal citizenship 
status of sexual minorities. 
When it comes to Croatia, the first Pride March was organized in Zagreb in 
2002 as an act of solidarity with the first Belgrade Pride held a year earlier; it marked 
the beginning of the politics of visibility that brought the issue of unequal citizenship 
status of sexual minorities into the public discourses. The Pride attracted around 300 
participants and is mostly remembered for the violence from the numerous anti-
                                                 
18 Comparing the 2001 Belgrade Pride and 2002 Zagreb Pride Sanja Kajinić observes that the obvious 
inspiration for these events was the legacy of Stonewall Rebellion and the empowering energy 
generated by the numerous Pride Marches held in the Anglophonic West (Kajinić, 2003).  
19 Christian Nielsen (2013) explains the inadequate reaction of the government regarding the violence 
caused by members of nationalist and hooligan groups by pointing to the relationship between these 
groups and political parties in Serbia. 
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Pride protesters.20 However, unlike the first Belgrade Pride, Zagreb Pride enjoyed the 
wide support of political elites coming from the ruling pro-EU government, with 
some of them even participating in the Pride March. Zagreb Pride managed to 
become an annual event involving less and less violence, mostly due to the support 
of the part of the political elites. According to organisers, in 2013 the Zagreb Pride 
March attracted around 15,000 participants and it went without any disruption.21 In 
addition to Zagreb, Split, the second largest city in Croatia located in the coastal 
region of Dalmatia, saw its first Pride March in 2011 during the rule of the right-wing 
government and right-wing mayor. The participants in the March were both 
physically and verbally attacked by the large numbers of protesters with police 
failing to protect them properly. In the following year, which marked the end of the 
right-wing government, Split Pride enjoyed strong police protection from possible 
attacks.  
Although the first Pride March in Montenegro was scheduled to take place in 
Podgorica in October 2013,22 the first Pride in Montenegro was suddenly, without 
much preparations and publicity, held in the coastal tourist town of Budva in July 
2013. The Pride participants were verbally and physically attacked by numerous anti-
Pride protesters. However, larger violence was successfully avoided due to the 
strong police protection.  
Pride Marches, especially those taking place in Belgrade, Split, and Budva 
have been strongly linked to the discourses of EU accession. Speaking about the 
events in relation to Belgrade Pride 2010 Linda Freimane, Co-Chair of ILGA Europe’s 
Executive Board, praised the Serbian government for proving that ‘they are serious 
in their respect for everyone’s right to exercise their fundamental rights, and for 
European integration.’23At the same time, subsequent bans of Belgrade Pride due to 
alleged security reasons were condemned by ILGA Europe, EU and the member 
states officials as well the representatives of Delegation of the European Union to 
Serbia. In particular, commenting on the ban of Belgrade Pride in 2012, Birgitta 
Ohlsson, the Swedish Minister for European Affairs, inserted that the ban of the 
                                                 
20 Despite the strong and mostly successful police protection of the first Zagreb Pride, the marchers 
were verbally assaulted by groups of skinheads, football fans, and visually unmarked ‘ordinary’ 
citizens (Kahlina, 2012). 
21 J.C. and I.M. ‘Zagreb ima 15 000 razloga za ponos: Pogledajte kako je bilo na najmasovnijem Prideu’ 
[Zagreb has 15 000 Reasons to be Proud], Index.hr, June 15, 2013, available at 
http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/zagreb-ima-15000-razloga-za-ponos-pogledajte-kako-je-bilo-na-
najmasovnijem-prideu/683438.aspx, last retrieved in July 2013. 
22 ‘Pozivaju minister na Paradu’ [They are inviting Ministers to the Parade], RTCG, June 18, 2013, 
available at http://www.rtcg.me/vijesti/drustvo/19692/svi-ministri-da-dodju-na-paradu.html, last 
retreived in July 2013. 
23 Cited in Joreen, S. ‘Belgrade Pride shows Serbia’s progress despite anti-gay violence,’ EuroOut 
portal, October, 2010. Available at http://eurout.org/2010/10/11/belgrade-pride-shows-serbia-s-
progress-amidst-anti-gay-violence, last retrieved in June 2013. 
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Pride March may complicate Serbia’s path to EU membership.24 In her speech, 
Ohlsson portrayed the EU as a defender of human rights, minority rights, freedom of 
speech, and freedom of assembly and made a direct link between the strong 
commitment to these values and EU membership.25  
The insufficient protection of Split Pride 2011 provoked similar reactions from 
EU officials. The failure of state institutions to protect the participants has been 
regarded as inconsistent with ‘European values’ and a possible sign of insufficient 
progress when it comes to the EU accession process. EU MP Marije Cornelissen who 
participated in this event saw it as a ‘disgrace for a country that is so close to 
becoming a member of the EU.’26 The strongest reactions came from Stella Ronner 
Grubačić, the Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Croatia who said 
that in the light of the events in Split, the Netherlands will ask for prolonged 
monitoring in relation to the accession process.27  
The most recent example comes from Montenegro. Commenting on events 
related to the Pride March in Budva, both Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo 
Đukanović and the Minister of Interior Raško Konjević referred to European values 
and the desired EU accession.28 Furthermore, commenting on the official 
announcement of the first Pride March in Podgorica scheduled for October 2013 Jelko 
Kacin, Member of EP and Vice-Chair of the Delegation for relations with Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, stated that institutional 
support to Pride March would represent an important message which may 
contribute to the opening of Chapter 23 of acquis (Judiciary and fundamental rights), 
thus bringing Montenegro closer to EU membership.29  
                                                 
24 See ‘Cancelled Pride Festival damages Serbia’s EU membership bid’ published on Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe web-portal, October 8, 2012. Available at 
http://www.aldeparty.eu/en/news/cancelled-pride-festival-damages-serbias-eu-membership-bid, last 
retrieved in June 2013. 
25 Here is the excerpt from Ohlsson’s speech published on the Government Offices of Sweden web-portal 
in October 2012: ‘I am a strong friend of the enlargement. The European Union comes with 
commitment to human rights, commitment to minority rights, commitment to freedom of speech, 
commitment to freedom of assembly. These are the core values of the union. LGBT-rights are human 
rights. I expect the Serbian government to deliver on this.’ The whole speech is available at 
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/12722/a/201012, last retrieved in June 2013. 
26 The whole statement is contained in a video made by Zagreb Pride, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvvvUhqRc3c 
27 See http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/zbog-nereda-u-splitu-nizozemska-trazi-monitoring-hrvatske-
sve-do-ulaska-u-eu/556453.aspx 
28 ‘Đukanović: Protiv sam političkog paradiranja’ [Đukanović: I am against political parading], CDM, 
July 24, 2013, available at http://www.cdm.me/drustvo/crna-gora/dukanovic-protiv-sam-politickog-
paradiranja, last retrieved in July 2013. 
29 ‘Kacin: Povorka ponosa doprinosi otvaranju poglavlja 23’ [Kacin: Pride March Contributes to 
Opening of the Chapter 23], CDM, July 2, 2013, available at http://www.cdm.me/drustvo/crna-
gora/kacin-povorka-ponosa-doprinosi-otvaranju-poglavlja-23, last retrieved in July 2013. Furthermore, 
the EU monitoring is also reflected in the presence of the European Parliament member Marije 
Cornelissen in the Pride Marches in Croatia and Serbia. Marije has also been a member of European 
Parliament's Intergroup on LGBT Rights.  
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The statements that criticise the failure of state institutions to guarantee the 
right to assembly to sexual minorities suggest the emergence of a new discourse that 
fills the supposed EU identity with the values of liberal pluralism, such as equal 
citizenship status of sexual minorities. These values, according to the EU officials, 
should be adopted by the candidate countries.  
There is little doubt that the emergence of the discourses of liberal pluralism 
and sexual equality contributed to increased visibility and different, non-stigmatising 
representation of sexual minorities in the cultural sphere, thus improving the overall 
social position of sexual minorities. Moreover, Pride Marches have served as a 
powerful tool in challenging the dominant public/private divide which places the 
issues of sexuality away from the public domain of citizenship. As Berlant and 
Warner (2003) argue, by confining the issue of sexuality to privacy, dominant 
conceptions of citizenship conceal the ways in which the national membership has 
been sexualized. In this regard, the support of the EU for the Pride Marches in the 
post-Yugoslav space together with the global politics of sexuality had certain positive 
effects on the citizenship status of sexual minorities.  
However, we can also find considerable contextual differences when it comes 
to the rhetoric of the political elites concerning the Pride Marches in these three 
contexts, which influences their transformatory power. In Croatia, political elites 
from the liberal and centre-left parties unambiguously supported Pride Marches, 
drawing on the discourses of ‘Europeaness’, liberal pluralism, and tolerance. For 
example, commenting upon the violence against sexual minorities taking place 
during the first Split Pride in 2011 Croatian president Ivo Josipović invoked the 
notion of ‘European values’ by depicting such behaviour as un-European and thus in 
conflict with the ‘true face of Croatia.’30 Moreover, some of the leading politicians 
even participated in Pride Marches, most notably in the first Zagreb Pride in 2002 
and the second and third Split Pride in 2012 and 2013.31 As we saw above, the Pride 
March in Budva, as well as the upcoming Pride in Podgorica, have also enjoyed the 
full support of the local government. However, notwithstanding the support 
expressed by a number of political parties, none of the Ministers in the present 
Government took part in the Pride March.  
In Serbia, the pro-EU political elites were more ambiguous in their support for 
the Pride Marches than their Croatian and Montenegrin counterparts. Along the 
aforementioned reluctance to react swiftly to the violent threats coming from the 
nationalist and hooligan groups, high state officials have often stated that their 
support for the Pride March is mainly dependent on pressure from the EU. Before 
the Belgrade Pride was supposed to take place in 2011, the Minister of Interior from 
                                                 
30 ‘Ivo Josipović: Nasilje u Splitu nije pravo lice Hrvatske’ [Violence in Split is not the real face of 
Croatia], SEEBIZ, June 12, 2011. Available at http://www.seebiz.eu/ivo-josipovic-nasilje-u-splitu-nije-
pravo-lice-hrvatske/ar-5680/, last retrieved in July 2013. 
31 These events will be remembered by the presence of several ministers in the government. Moreover, 
Mirela Holy from the Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) and Vesna Pusić from Croatian Peoples Party 
(HNS) many times participated in Zagreb Pride March.  
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the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) Ivica Dačić asserted that the police would be better 
off if the Pride did not take place.32 On the same occasion Dačić also publicly 
disclosed that he received memos from the European Commission and European 
Parliament stressing that these bodies have been carefully monitoring the Pride 
March in Belgrade.33 Assessing the ways in which the ruling elites in Serbia linked 
their support for the Pride with EU monitoring, Marek Mikuš (2011) argues that this 
can be regarded as a successful political strategy. According to Mikuš, in this way the 
ruling elites coming from the pro-EU parties managed to ‘externalise the 
responsibility’ for the March without losing their image of gay rights defenders.  
However, the rhetorical strategy that externalises support for the Pride March 
inevitably bears some negative effects. Most notably, it reinforces the already existing 
perception common among the anti-March protestors that the Pride March conveys 
values that are foreign to Serbian contexts, and thus can be harmful for Serbian 
identity and tradition (Mikuš, 2011). In this way, the rhetorical strategy employed by 
the political elites in Serbia directly feeds into the growing homophobia that has 
gained a significant presence in public discourse. As I will show in the following 
section, heterosexist visions of national identity and tradition informed by the 
nationalist legacy of the 1990s represent the main ground for contesting the changing 
citizenship status of sexual minorities. Moreover, homophobic discourses were 
employed against the EU conditionality and have placed the transformation of sexual 
citizenship in the centre of wider political struggles over EU accession.  
   
3.4.  Heteronormativity employed against Europeanisation: Persisting 
nationalist and religious discourses 
 
Pride Marches taking place in the past decade in Serbia and Croatia augmented the 
violence against sexual minorities. The violence was followed by the increasing 
homophobia employed by the right-wing parties, nationalist groups and Orthodox 
and Catholic Church officials. In Serbia the new ‘anti-homosexual politics’ became 
rather influential among the larger population.34 Homophobic discourses emerging 
since the 2000s depicted sexual non-conformity as the epitome of the ‘Western 
values’ that threaten the ‘authentic Serbian tradition and Serbian society.’ Its strength 
and relative success largely lies in the way it combines the ethno-nationalist 
conceptions of community and belonging from the 1990s, the widespread hostility 
towards sexual minorities, and the existing anti-Western discourse.  
                                                 
32 ‘Dačić: Za policiju bolje da ne bude gej parade’ [It would be better for the police if the Parade were 
not to be held], RTV, September 23, 2011, available at http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/dacic:-za-
policiju-bolje-da-ne-bude-gej-parade_274570.html, last retrieved in July 2013. 
33 Ibid.  
34 I would like to thank Dr Zorica Mršević for drawing my attention to the political utility of 
homophobic discoruses in contemporary Serbia. Author's interview with Zorica Mršević, Belgrade, 
December 9, 2012.  
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One of the backbones of nationalist-religious homophobic discourses has been 
the alleged threat of the so-called ‘white plague’, i.e. the decreasing birth-rates, which 
has been framed as insufficient reproduction of ethnically pure Serb-citizens. This 
threat, it has been argued, will become stronger once sexual minorities become equal 
to heterosexual citizens. The arguments about the ‘white plague’ which supposedly 
endangers the future existence of the Serbian nation have also been put forward in 
relation to the non-violent anti-Pride March protest called Family Walk (Porodična 
šetnja) organised by the nationalist organisation Sebian Doorway (Dveri srpske). The 
event took place in Belgrade a couple of days before the second Belgrade Pride in 
2010. As one of the organisers explicitly stated: ‘there have been many reasons for the 
Family Walk. There are 30,000 more Serbs dying than being born each year. We have 
been among the oldest populations in the world. […] There have been 150,000 
abortions yearly. Instead of addressing the issue of the white plague […] our state is 
taking care of one aggressive minority group.’35 
As the above excerpt suggests, the white plague discourse is closely related to 
the conceptions of the nation in terms of lineage that became dominant in the context 
of the violent break-up of SFR Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s. In line with 
the logic that conceives national community in terms of common descent sexuality is 
perceived as closely linked with the transmission of the nation’s essence. According 
to this logic, while heterosexual reproduction plays an important role in securing 
national survival, while non-reproductive practices and non-heterosexual identities 
are perceived as a direct threat to the nation. Therefore, they must be excluded from 
belonging to the national community.  
The fear of the ‘white plague’ has been combined with the nationalist 
arguments that invoke the alleged ‘heterosexual Serbian tradition’ that stands in the 
opposition to the ‘Western immorality’ and ‘decadence’ which have been imposed in 
the context of EU conditionality. The infliction of the ‘immoral values’ that celebrate 
sexual non-conformity in the Serbian context, as the argument goes, serves as an 
attempt to extinguish the Serbian nation.36  
Perception of gay rights as something that is imposed by the EU and 
represents a threat to the nation has been widely present in Croatia as well. The 
discourse that frames sexual equality as EU’s threat to ‘Croatian tradition’ surfaced 
in the term ‘eurofaggotization’ (europederizacija) of Croatia, which appeared on the 
leaflets that were distributed in Zagreb a month before the first Zagreb Pride in 
                                                 
35 ‘Porodičnom šetnjom protiv Parade ponosa’ [With the Family Walk against the Pride Parade], 
Pressonline, October 8, 2010, available at http://www.pressonline.rs/info/politika/136016/porodicnom-
setnjom-protiv-parade-ponosa.html, last retreived in July 2013. My translation. 
36 The joining of anti-EU, nationalist and homophobic logic has often been present in the rhetoric of 
nationalist organisation Serbian Doorways. See for example article by Branimir Nešić published on 
Serbian Doorways web-portal ‘Da li može da postoji gej brak?’ [Can There Be Such a Thing as Gay 
Marriage?], May 28, 2013, available at http://www.dverisrpske.com/sr-CS/dverjani/branimir-
nesic/tekstovi/da-li-moze-da-postoji-gej-brak.php, last retrieved in July 2013. 
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2002.37 The term implicitly accuses the government of putting the ‘integrity’ and 
‘purity’ of Croatia in danger with its liberal pro-EU politics, imposing new sexual 
norms that are argued to be alien to ‘Croatian traditions’ and as such represent a 
threat to its national integrity. The amalgamation of anti-EU and homophobic 
discourses re/surfaced especially in relation to Split Pride Marches,38 which were 
organised at a time when Croatia was close to entering the EU and when the careful 
monitoring of Pride Marches was explicitly related to successful closure of 
negotiation process.  
In Croatia discourses of low birth rates and a dying nation were also present, 
though they were not so central to anti-gay mobilisation. The anti-gay rhetoric has 
been mostly grounded in the (hetero)normative conceptions of family as the epitome 
of the Christian values upon which Croatian tradition and nation is said to be based 
on. From that perspective the sexual politics of visibility and the ongoing 
transformation of sexual citizenship have been conceived as threats to the existing 
conception of family, and, by extension, to national tradition and Catholic values.39 
Therefore, the protection of the heterosexual nuclear family as the basic social unit 
came to the centre of the campaigns directed against sexual equality. 
As part of this trend the new initiative against sexual equality called ‘In the 
Name of the Family’ (U ime obitelji) was formed in spring 2013. The initiative gained 
significant visibility by launching the nationwide campaign for the referendum to 
include the heteronormative definition of marriage as ‘life partnership between a 
woman and a man’ in the Croatian Constitution. The campaign puts emphasis on the 
importance of a referendum as an ‘expression of direct democracy’ which ‘gives the 
opportunity to all citizens to express their opinion on the marriage.’40 Employment of 
the discourses of direct democracy in this case may be interpreted as a strategic move 
which allows them to explicitly oppose the recent changes of sexual citizenship 
without betraying the dominant nationalist narrative of Croatian European origins. 
                                                 
37 ‘Zagrebom kruži crveni letak protiv Gay pridea’ [Red Leaflet against the Gay Pride Circulates in 
Zagreb], Jutarnji list, May 27, 2002, p. 20. 
38 Thus, speaking on behalf of ‘Civil headquarters for the defense of the Waterfront’ (Građanski stožer za 
obranu Rive), an initiative aiming at preventing the Split Pride March from taking place in the city 
centre, said that during the EU accession process ‘we (sic!) got ourselves into the position where we 
export our money and wealth and import the gay parade’, quoted in ‘Split Pride: Osnovan stožer za 
obranu Rive’ [Split Pride: Civil headquarters for the defense of the Waterfront has been established], 
Dalmacija News, June 1, 2012, available at 
http://www.dalmacijanews.com/Hrvatska/View/tabid/77/ID/90023/Split-Pride-Osnovan-Graanski-
stozer-za-obranu-Rive.aspx, last retrieved in July 2013. My translation.  
39 For example, expressing their discontent with the Split Pride, the organisation of Croatian defenders 
from Croatia, BiH and diaspora called ‘Commitment’ (Zavjet) stated that in their fight for Croatia’s 
independence they ‘cherished the values of family, tradition, culture and catholic faith, which is, 
unfortunately, threatened by the behaviour of a minority’, quoted in ‘Branitelji zbog gay parade 
prijete prosvjedom [Because of the Gay Parades the Defenders are Threatening with the Protest], 
Index.hr, June 14, 2011, available at http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/branitelji-zbog-gay-parada-
prijete-prosvjedom/556624.aspx, last retrieved in July 2013. My translation.  
40 ‘In the Name of the Family’ promotional leaflet. My translation.  
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At the same time, so far the campaign has been successful as they managed to collect 
the signatures required for the referendum. The procedure is still in progress and it is 
yet to be seen whether the referendum will take place. However, there is a possibility 
that the campaign achieves the re/definition of the sexual citizenship through the 
change of the Constitution. This would secure the unequal citizenship status of 
sexual minorities, which would be even harder to challenge in the future.  
In Montenegro, one of the most notable public expressions of homophobia 
came from the Minister for Human and Minority Rights Ferhat Dinoša himself who 
stated that he ‘would not be delighted to hear that there are gay people in 
Montenegro' and declined to give his support for the Pride March planned to take 
place in Podgorica in May 2011 (Alković, 2012). After the joint pressure of non-
governmental organisations and recommendations from the EU officials, Dinoša was 
finally removed from the government. Wider mobilisation against the equal 
citizenship status of sexual minorities can be observed in relation to the first Pride 
March in Budva in July 2013. However, since the systematic politics of visibility have 
just started there, it remains to be seen what kind of discourses will emerge in 
response. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper I was tracing the transformation of sexual citizenship taking place in the 
context of EU accession process in the new states of South East Europe. I showed that 
under the influence of EU conditionality, there have been major shifts when it comes 
to citizenship status of sexual minorities in post-Yugoslav context. These changes 
have been largely related to the tangible modifications in the laws that define the 
citizenship status of sexual minorities as well as in opening up the space for 
mobilisation of sexual rights-based activism. When it comes to legal interventions 
concerning sexual citizenship, as I showed in my paper, the specific changes were in 
most cases justified by the mandatory legal harmonisation with the EU acquis. 
However, since the EU acquis contains a very narrow set of remedies when it comes 
to sexually based discrimination, focused mostly on the field of employment, the 
particular changes that resulted from the legal harmonisation have also been partial 
and highly selective. In particular, there have been limited improvements in relation 
to the civil rights of sexual minorities, with the protection against discrimination 
being introduced mainly in the fields of labour, media, and education. Furthermore, 
in Croatia same-sex relationships even obtained partial legal recognition with the 
Same-Sex Partnerships Act and the new act on Life Partnerships is underway. 
However, notwithstanding these positive changes, citizenship remains to be 
sexualised as the heterosexual nuclear family persists as a basic principle of 
organisation and allocation of citizenship rights and benefits.  
Along with the limited scope of legal changes, as I demonstrated in my paper, 
EU accession process in the post-Yugoslav context made a great impact on the 
emerging politics of visibility and activism directed against sexually-based 
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inequality. This has been manifested in the EU’s support for Pride Marches, 
providing both material and argumentative resources to local activists involved in 
their organisation. The politics of visibility performed by activist groups influenced 
the shift towards less stigmatising representation of sexual minorities in public space. 
I also argued that the emergence of more positive representations of sexual 
minorities is closely related with the new visions of national identity in terms of 
liberal pluralism and ‘Europeanness’ that were in different ways and to different 
extents incorporated in the rhetoric of pro-European political elites. 
However, I also showed that the legal changes regarding citizenship status of 
sexual minorities and their greater visibility supported by the discourses of tolerance 
and liberal pluralism provoked strong anti-gay mobilisation. This mobilisation was 
manifested in the growing violence against sexual minorities and the increasing 
presence of nationalist religion-inspired homophobia in the media. As I have argued, 
these homophobic discourses evoke the idea of the nation as a common lineage and 
place heterosexism in the centre of national identity and tradition. In doing so, they 
often draw its legitimacy from the nation-building processes taking place in the 
1990s. Thus, as my main argument reads, rather than representing an 
unambiguously liberating force, EU accession in the post-Yugoslav context facilitated 
the turning of sexual citizenship into a contested terrain where the struggles between 
the competing visions of ‘Europeanness’, national identity, and tradition take place.  
The developments related to the changing position of sexual minorities in 
post-Yugoslav space also suggest that sexuality has been playing a critical role in the 
re/definition of national identities in the globalising world. The examples I observed 
re-affirm the claims that local narratives and historical trajectories play critical roles 
when it comes to translation of the unstable meanings of sexual citizenship in local 
contexts (Binnie, 2004). The ever changing constellations of competing discourses in 
the local context influence the ways in which certain globalising norms and values 
will be negotiated by the local actors. This process of negotiation, in turn, brings 
changes to existing meanings and practices.  
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